Thai Digital ID CA G3

Certification Policy/Certificate Practice Statement Identifier (OID): 2.16.764.1.1.2.1.0.2.8

Revision History

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Note :

TDID PCA = TDID Policy Creation Authority

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1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

Thai Digital ID Co., Ltd. (“TDID CA”) is a leading Certificate Authority established in 2000 with a mission to provide comprehensive certificate services, foster IT security, and build confidence in the Thai e-commerce group. Applying advanced Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology, TDID CA is an expert in the development and distribution of IT security systems in both hardware and software forms, which enabling the digital signatures solution. Additionally, TDID CA offers services for the design, development, and implementation of customer CA systems by utilizing industry-standard CA hardware and software to deliver its services. Striving for excellence, TDID provides CA system service in accordance with the WebTrust for CA and ISO 27001 safety standards, contributing to elevating Thailand's IT security level to international benchmarks.

This document is titled “Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement” or “CP/CPS” in compliance with the Internet Engineering Task Force Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (IETF PKIX) Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework [RFC3647] and meant to inform all relying parties related to the electronic certificates by Thai Digital ID Certification Authority: TDID CA.

TDID CA adheres to the latest Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates published on http://www.cabforum.org. The baseline requirement shall supersede if any conflict arises.

The Certificate Authority Common Name (CN) for TDID is “Thai Digital ID CA G3”, which includes issuing Personal Certificate, Enterprise Certificate, Enterprise User Certificate, Computer/Equipment Certificate, and Web Server Certificate (SSL Certificate).

TDID CA is the Subordinate CA under Thailand National Root Certificate Authority (NRCA). Relying parties can directly trust the root certificates of the Thailand National Root Certificate Authority (NRCA) because Thailand National Root Certificate Authority (NRCA) is the highest-level CA and trust anchor.

The CP/CPS applies to Thai Digital ID Company Limited ’s all subordinate certification authorities under Thailand National Root Certificate Authority (NRCA) and thereby provides assurances of uniform trust throughout the Thailand National Root Certificate Authority (NRCA).

1.2 Document Name and Identification

This document is titled “Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement”, or “CP/CPS” owned by the certificate authority and meant to inform all parties related to the electronic certificates of and clarify the statements in the certificate policy.

The Object Identifier (OID) for TDID CA and sub -value arc of joint-iso-itu-t- (2) country (16) TH (764) ETDA (1) NRCA (1) TDID CA (2),

TDID CA organizes its OID as follows:

OID Types	TDID OIDs	CA/B Forum OIDs
TDID OID	2.16.764.1.1.2.1	
TDID CP/CPS Document Class	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.0	
TDID CP/CPS Verion 2.8	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.0.2.8	
TDID Certificate Specification Class	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.1	
Personal Certificate	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.1.20001.1	
Juristic Person Certificate	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.1.10001.1	
Enterprise User Certificate	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.1.10002.1	
Machine Certificate	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.1.40001.1	
TLS/SSL Certificate – Organization Validation	2.16.764.1.1.2.1.1.30001.1	2.23.140.1.2.2

1.3 PKI Participants

1.3.1 Thailand National Root Certification Authority (Thailand NRCA):

Thailand NRCA is the highest-level certification authority, trust anchor, of the PKI domain in Thailand. Thailand NRCA is responsible for managing Subordinate CAs.

1.3.2 Thai Digital ID Certification Authorities: TDID CA

Certification authority responsible issuance of a digital certificate to a person or legal entity by using a collection of hardware, software, personnel, and operating procedures that create, sign, and issue certication of public key for Subscribers and for publication of Certificate Revocation List, also known as CRL.

In this CP/CPS, CAs refers to those established and owned by Thai Digital ID Company Limited and they are subordinate CAs under NRCA.

1.3.3 Thai Digital ID Registration Authorities: TDID RA

Registration authority for requests of Certificate Issuance, Revocation, and Renewal, responsible for verification of Subscriber's information entered in the Certification Authorities' form.

1.3.4 Subscribers

Individuals, companies, or other entities with Certificates from the Certificate Authorities.

1.3.5 Relying Parties

Individuals, companies, or other entities who recognize any Digital Signature Trust or Certificate. A Relying Parties may or may not be a Subscriber of the Certificate Authorities who engages in actions or inaction due to the recognition of such Digital Signature Trust or Certificate to verify the identity of the Subscriber whose name appears on the Certificate5

1.3.6 Other Participants

Individuals, companies, or other entities apart from those mentioned above such as Providers of Repository Service or Outsourced Certificate Authorities, etc.

1.4 Certificate Usage

Certificates issued by Certificate Authorities consist of 5 categories of Certificates, namely:

(1) Personal Certificates are issued to individuals or generic civilians for security of electronic transactions. Valid for 1 or 2 years.
(2) Juristic Person Certificates are issued to legal persons including governmental or private organizations or companies for security of electronic transactions. Valid for 1 or 2 years.
(3) Enterprise User Certificates are issued to officials of an organization including governmental or private organizations or companies for security of electronic transactions. Valid for 1 or 2 years.
(4) Machine Certificates are issued to computers or Equipment that utilize network communicate, such as routers. The main purpose of Machine Certificate is to ensure the security of online transactions. This type of certificate has a validity period of 1 or 2 years.
(5) TLS/SSL Certificate are used for Web Server Authentication. The maximum validity period for TLS/SSL shall be as follows:

TLS/SSL Certificate issued on or after	TLS/SSL Certificate issued before	maximum validity period
	March 15, 2026	398 days
March 15, 2026	March 15, 2027	200 days
March 15, 2027	March 15, 2029	100 days
March 15, 2029		47 days

1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

This CP/CPS covers several different types of Certificates. The following table provides a brief description of the appropriate uses of each. The descriptions are for guidance only and are not binding.

Type of Certificate	Appropriate Use
Personal Certificate Juristic Person Certificate Enterprise User Certificate	Used in the process of digitally signing a document, this ensures that the portion of the document signed by the signer remains unmodified.

Machine Certificate	Used to authenticate and secure communication between servers in a network, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of data transfers. Device-to-Device Used in scenarios where devices need to communicate securely with each other.
TLS/SSL Certificate	Use to secure web server communication. TLS/SSL Certificate provide encryption and authentication for data transmitted between a web server and a web browser.

1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

Certificates issued to Individuals or Legal Persons by the Certificate Authorities must only be used as described usages under item 1.4. Other uses are strictly prohibited.

1.5 Policy Administration

The details of Policy Creation Authority (also known as PCA) of the Certificate Authority responsible for this CP/CPS are described below.

Name:	Thai Digital ID CA
Company Registration No.:	0105543112679
Trading as:	TDID CA
Postal Address:	319, 25th Floor, Room 10-11, Chamchuri Square Building, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330 Thailand.
Phone:	+66-2029-0290 ext 4
Domain Name:	www.thaidigitalid.com
Email Address:	support@thaidigitalid.com
Contact:	Policy Creation Authority, Thai Digital ID Co., Ltd. 319, 25th Floor, Room 10-11, Chamchuri Square Building, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330

1.5.1 Organization Administering the CP/CPS Document

Policy Creation Authority of the Certificate Authority

1.5.2 Contact Person

General Inquiries

Policy Creation Authority

Thai Digital ID Co., Ltd.

319, 25th Floor, Room 10-11, Chamchuri Square Building, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330

www.thaidigitalid.com

Email: support@thaidigitalid.com

Tel: +66-2029-0290 ext 4

Certificate Problem Reports

Subscriber, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may report suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, Certificates used to sign Suspect Code, Takeover Attacks, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to certificates by sending email to: ra@thaidigitalid.com

1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for Policy

Policy Creation Authority of the Certificate Authority, including internal auditors and external auditors.

1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures

Any change to this CP/CPS must be approved by the PCA of the Certificate Authority before the change is made.

If the change is approved by the PCA, the change will be applied through the Change Control Procedure by the PCA to the Managing Director. Once approved by the MD, the Version of the CP/CPS shall be revised in the Change Log section before it is published on the Company's website.

The CP/CPS document is normally reviewed once yearly by the PCA and the revision will be submitted for the Managing Director's approval through Change Control Procedure and recorded in the Change Log section before it is published on the Company's website: www.thaidigitalid.com.

1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

1.6.1 Definitions

Terms	Definitions
Certification Authority/TDID CA	Thai Digital ID Company Limited under TDID CA Service, responsible for issuance of Certificates, approval of Public Keys for Subscribers, and publication of Certificate Revocation List.
Registration Authority/TDID RA	Certificate Registrar responsible for accepting Application for Certificate Issuance and Revocation by reviewing and verifying the information given by the Subscriber.
Certificate	An electronic document that forms the Public Key infrastructure of the Subscribers that may be individuals, legal persons, or devices. Such electronic document must be compliant with the standards of X.509 Version 3 Certificate and comprise at least the following: — Electronic Certificate Version — Electronic Certificate Identification Number — The Procedure used to create the Digital Signature of the Electronic Certificate Holders. — Name of the Certificate Authority — Start and end date of Certificate usage — Name of the Certificate holder — The Certificate holder's Public Key and Creation Algorithm
Subscriber	An individual or legal person that subscribe to the Certificate with the Certificate Authority. The issued Certificate will bear the name of the Subscriber on it.
Key	Symbol, series of symbols, or electronic signal related to the symbols used for encryption or decryption of data.
Private Key	Key used to generate Digital Signature that can be used to decrypt an encrypted electronic data in order to understand the encrypted data. The Private Key will be used to generate the Digital Signature.
Public Key	The Key used to verify the Digital Signature and encrypt electronic data in order to secure the confidentiality of the encrypted data. The Public Key will be used to verify the Digital Signature.
Key Pair	Private Key and Public Key used for asymmetric encryption where the Private Key is generated with mathematical relationship to the Public Key and the Public Key can be used to verify whether the Private Key is used to create a certain Digital Signature. The Public Key can be used to encrypt electronic data to maintain

Terms	Definitions
	confidentiality except to individuals with Private Key that can be used to decrypt the electronic data.
Digital Signature	A type of electronic signature that consists of numbers generated with electronic data to be used with Key Pair. The Signature holder's Public Key can be used to verify whether the Signature is generated with their Private Key and whether the signed electronic data has been altered after it is digitally signed.
Certificate Revocation	Termination of Electronic Certificate's usage that revoke the function of the Subscriber's Private Key in creating Digital Signature and electronic data decryption. Certificate revocations do not affect the Public Key or Certificate, which can still be used to verify the Digital Signature generated before the Revocation.
Certificate Revocation List	The list of rovoked Electronic Certificate
Relying Party	Persons who engage in or abstain from certain actions relying the trust in Electronic Certificate or Digital Signature by utilizing the Public Key available in the Certificate to verify the identity of the subscriber who digitally signed and whose name appears on the Certificate.
Directory	The data repository properly managed for search capability that is quick and compliant with the directorial standards (X.500 or LDAP)
Database	The data repository that allows convenient and fast access, management, and edit by computer programs.
Linting	A process in which the content of digitally signed data such as a Precertificate [RFC 6962], Certificate, Certificate Revocation List, or OCSP response, or data-to-be signed object such as a tbsCertificate (as described in RFC 5280, Section 4.1.1.1) is checked for conformance with the profiles and requirements defined in CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.
Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration	A process by which the determinations made during domain validation and CAA checking by the Primary Network Perspective are corroborated by other Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance.
Network Perspective	Related to Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. A system (e.g., a cloud-hosted server instance) or collection of network components (e.g., a VPN and corresponding infrastructure) for sending outbound Internet traffic associated with a domain control validation method and/or CAA check. The location of a Network Perspective is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound Internet traffic is typically first handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that perspective.

Terms	Definitions
Application Software Supplier	A supplier of Internet browser software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Certificates and incorporates the root certificates of the Thailand National Root Certificate Authority (NRCA).
Primary Network Perspective	The Network Perspective used by TDID CA to make the determination of 1) TDID CA's authority to issue a Certificate for the requested domain(s) or IP address(es) and 2) the Applicant's authority and/or domain authorization or control of the requested domain(s) or IP address(es).
Applicant	The natural person or legal entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate is issued, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the Applicant is the entity that controls or operates the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual certificate request.
Wildcard Certificate	A certificate containing at least one Wildcard Domain Name in the Subject Alternative Names in the Certificate.
Wildcard Domain Name	A string starting with "*." (U+002A ASTERISK, U+002E FULL STOP) immediately followed by a Fully-Qualified Domain Name.
Fully-Qualified Domain Name	A Domain Name that includes the domain labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System.
Authorization Domain Name	The FQDN used to obtain authorization for a given FQDN to be included in a Certificate. TDID CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If a Wildcard Domain Name is to be included in a Certificate, then the TDID CA shall remove "*." From the left-most portion of the Wildcard Domain Name to yield the corresponding FQDN. TDID CA may prune zero or more domain labels of the FQDN from left to right until encountering a base domain name and may use any one of the values that were yielded by pruning (including the base domain name itself) for the purpose of domain validation.
Onion Domain Name	: A Fully Qualified Domain Name ending with the RFC 7686 ".onion" special-use Domain Name. For example, 2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion is an Onion Domain Name.

1.6.2 Acronyms

Acronyms	Term
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
FQDN	Fully-Qualified Domain Name
DNS	DNS Domain Name System
NRCA	National Root Certification Authority
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
PA	Policy Authority
RAO	Registration Authority Officer

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1 Repositories

All data related to Electronic Certificate request will be recorded in the database and signed the Registration Authority while the Electronic Certificate will be stored in X.500 Directory.

2.2 Publication of Information

This CP/CPS publicly available and publication of certificates and related information online on the following URL: https://www.thaidigitalid.com/downloads/

2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

The Certificate will be published on the X.500 Directory immediately on issuance within seven calendar days after accepting issuance by an upper level CA.

The Certificate Authority will keep the Certificate Policy/Certificate Practice Statement up to date and published on their website (www.thaidigitalid.com) as reference for all Subscribers and general public within three working days of the approval of changes.

Publication frequency of CRLs and frequency of updating OCSP records are specified in Sections 4.9.7 and 4.9.9.

2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

Electronic Certificates can be accessed through LDAP Protocol. Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement document can be downloaded from www.thaidigitalid.com.

3. Identificatiomn and Authentication (I&A)

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Type of Names

The name that appears on each Subscriber's Certificates will be unique and Distinguished Name (DN) to ensure that Certificates can refer to a Subscriber, Certificate Authority, or a Service Device, according to ISO/IEC 9594-1/ITU-T Recommendation X.500 The Directory: Overview of Concepts, Models and Services

3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The name that appears on each Certificate will have meanings that refer to the owner of such Certificate for identification of the owner of such Certificate.

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

The Common Name (CN) may be designated according to the Subscriber's preference.

The TDID CA does not issue anonymous or pseudonymous certificates.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

Rules for interpreting distinguished name forms are specified in X.501. Rules for interpreting e-mail addresses are specified in RFC 2822. RFC 2253 and RFC 2616 are interpreted as Uniform Resource Identifiers.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The names that appear on Certificates must be unique for each Certificate issued by the same CA to allow identification of the Certificate owners.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

TDID CA reserves reserves no liability to any certificate applicant on the usage of Distinguished Names appearing in a certificate. The right to use the name is the responsibility of the applicant and must be in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations, legal obligations, or announcements

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

Identity validation or authentication for certification is a responsibility of the Registration Authority. The Subscriber must fill the Electronic Certificate request form to apply as well as provide the evidence required for the Registration Authority. The details are described in item 4.1: Certificate Applications.

However, Identity verification for Personal Certificate applicants may be carried out by trusted third parties, referred to as Identity Provider (IdP). TDID CA may also request additional information or evidence as needed to reliably confirm the identity of applicants.

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

The Subscriber self-generates the key pairs and creates the PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request and signs it with the private key. When applying for a certification, the Certificate Signing Request is submitted

to the RA. The RA shall use the Subscriber's public key to verify the signature on the Certificate Signing Request to prove that the Subscriber is in possession of the corresponding private key.

3.2.2 Authentication of Organization Identity

The Certificate Authority will verify the juristic person certificate issued within 3 months by the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce before application and signed by an authorized director or corporate formation act.

For other processes, TDID CA shall conform to Authentication of Organization and Domain Identity Section in CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly Trusted Certificates with the latest version.

3.2.2.1 Identity

If the Subject Identity Information is to include the name or address of an organization, the CA shall verify the identity and address of the organization and that the address is the Applicant's address of existence or operation and verify the identity and address of the Applicant using documentation provided by, or through communication with, at least one of the following:

1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A third party database that is periodically updated and considered a Reliable Data Source;
3. A site visit by the CA or a third party who is acting as an agent for the CA; or
4. An Attestation Letter.

The CA may use the same documentation or communication described in 1 through 4 above to verify both the Applicant's identity and address.

The certification documents shall be affixed with the seal of the organization and responsible person The RAO shall check the authenticity of the application information submitted by the organization and representative identity and verify that the representative has the right to apply for the certificate in the organization's name, the organization must submit the correct certification documents which have been approved by the competent authority or a legally authorized body (such as a court) to the RAO.

3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename

TDID CA verifies DBA/tradename when the Subject Identity Information included.
Verification the Applicant's right to use the DBA/tradename using at least one of the following:

1. Documentation provided by, or communication with, a government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant's legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A Reliable Data Source;
3. Communication with a government agency responsible for the management of such DBAs or tradenames;
4. An Attestation Letter accompanied by documentary support; or

5. A utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government-issued tax document, or other form of identification that the CA determines to be reliable.

3.2.2.3 Verification of Country

TDID CA follows Section 3.2.2.3 of CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements.

3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control

TDID CA shall verify and confirm the Applicant's ownership or control of the domain prior to issuance. TDID CA validated each Fully Qualified Domian Name (FQDN) listed in the Certificate as follows:

1. When the FQDN is not an Onion Domain Name, TDID CA shall validate using DNS Change methods as CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements Section 3.2.2.4.7 . TDID shall confirming the presence of a Random Value or Request Token for either in a DNS CNAME, TXT or CAA recoed for either 1) an Authorization Domain Name; or 2) an Authorization Domain Name that is prefixed with a Domain Label that begin with an underscore character.
2. If a Random Value is used, TDID CA shall provide a Random Value unique to the Certificate request and shall not use the Random Value after
    i. 30 days or
    ii. If the Applicant submitted the certificate request, the time frame permitted for reuse of validated information relevant to the Certificate.
3. When the FQDN is an Onion Domian Name, TDID CA shall validate the FQDN in accordance with Appendix B of TLS Baseline Requirement

Completed validations of Applicant authority may be valid for the issuance of multiple Certificates over time. In all cases, the validation must have been initiated within the time period specified in the relevant requirement prior to Certificate issuance (according to Section 4.2.1 of TLS Baseline Requirement, for validation of Domain Names, any data, document, or completed validation used must be obtained no more than 398 days prior to issuing the Certificate). For purposes of domain validation, the term Applicant includes the Applicant's Parent Company, Subsidiary Company, or Affiliate. TDID CA shall maintain a record of which domain validation method, including relevant BR version number, they used to validate every domain.

Effective 15 March 2026: DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor shall be performed on all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorization or control by the Primary Network Perspective. The DNS resolver used for all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorization or control by the Primary Network Perspective must:

1) perform DNSSEC validation using the algorithm defined in RFC 4035 Section 5; and

2) support NSEC3 as defined in RFC 5155; and

3) support SHA-2 as defined in RFC 4509 and RFC 5702; and

4) properly handle the security concerns enumerated in RFC 6840 Section 4.

Effective 15 March 2026: TDID CA shall not use local policy to disable DNSSEC validation on any DNS query associated with the validation of domain authorization or control.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor may be performed on all DNS queries associated with the validation of domain authorization or control by Remote Network Perspectives used for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor is considered outside the scope of self-audits performed to fulfill the requirements in Section 8.7.

Note: FQDNs may be listed in Subscriber Certificates using dNSNames in the subjectAltName extension.

Performing validations using this method, TDID CA shall implement Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as specified in Section 3.2.2.9 of this CP/CPS. To count as corroborating, a Network Perspective must observe the same challenge information (i.e. Random Value or Request Token) as the Primary Network Perspective.

TDID CA and its affiliates DO NOT operate, manage, host, or provide DNS zones for any Applicant or Subscriber domain names used for Certificate issuance. Applicants are solely responsible for managing their own DNS infrastructure, including the creation and maintenance of DNS TXT, CNAME, or CAA records required for Domain Control Validation (DCV).

3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP Address

Not Applicable

3.2.2.6 Wildcard Domain Validation

Before issuing a certificate with a wildcard character (*) in a CN or subjectAltName of type DNS-ID, the TDID CA shall establish and follow a documented procedure that determines whether the wildcard character appears in the first label position immediatly to the left of a “registry-controlled” label or “public suffix” (e.g. “*.com”, “*.co.th”).

If a wildcard would fall within the label immediately to the left of a registry-controlled or public suffix, TDID CA MUST refuse issuance, unless the applicant demonstrates its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace. (e.g., TDID CA MUST NOT issue “*.co.th” or “*.local”, but MAY issue “*.example.com” to Example Co.).

Determination of what is “registry-controlled” versus the registerable portion of a Country Code Top-Level Domain Namespace is not standardized at the time of writing and is not a property of the DNS itself. TDID will use current best practice, which is to consult a “public suffix list” such as the Public Suffix List (PSL), and to retrieve a fresh copy regularly. If using the PSL, the TDID CA will consult the “ICANN DOMAINS” Section only, not the “PRIVATE DOMAINS” Section. The PSL is updated regularly to contain new gTLDs delegated by ICANN, which are listed in the “ICANN DOMAINS” Section.

The TDID CA may issuing a Wildcard Certificate to the Registrant of an entire gTLD, provided that control of the entire namespace is demonstrated in an appropriate way.”

3.2.2.7 Data Source Accuracy

Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, the TDID CA SHALL evaluate the source for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification. The Subordinate CA will consider the following during its evaluation:

1) The age of the information provided,

2) The frequency of updates to the information source,

3) The data provider and purpose of the data collection,

4) The public accessibility of the data availability, and

5) The relative difficulty in falsifying or altering the data.

Databases maintained by the TDID CA, its owner, or its affiliated companies do not qualify as a Reliable Data Source if the primary purpose of the database is to collect information for the purpose of fulfilling the validation requirements under this Section 3.2.

3.2.2.8 CAA Records

For TLS/SSL Certificates, TDID CA shall retrieve and process CAA records prior to Certificate issuance in accordance with RFC 8659, the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, and Section 4.2.2.1 of this CP/CPS.

CAA record processing is performed as part of the Certificate application review and issuance process. TDID CA's detailed CAA record processing practices are described in Section 4.2.2.1 of this CP/CPS.

3.2.2.8.1 SSL/TLS: DNSSEC Validation of CAA Records

Effective 2026-03-15, DNSSEC validation requirements applicable to CAA record processing for TLS/SSL Certificates are described in Section 4.2.2.1.3 of this CP/CPS.

TDID CA shall perform DNSSEC validation for CAA record lookups in accordance with Section 4.2.2.1.3, the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, and the applicable RFCs referenced therein.

3.2.2.9 Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration

Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempts to corroborate the determinations (i.e., domain validation pass/fail, CAA permission/prohibition) made by the Primary Network Perspective from multiple remote Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance.

TDID CA use either the same set, or different sets of Network Perspectives when performing Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration for the required 1) Domain Authorization or Control and 2) CAA Record checks.

The set of responses from the relied upon Network Perspectives provide TDID CA with the necessary information to allow it to affirmatively assess:

- a. the presence of the expected 1) Random Value, 2) Request Token, 3) IP Address, or 4) Contact Address, as required by the relied upon validation method specified in Section 3.2.2.4; and

- b. TDID CA's authority to issue to the requested domain(s), as specified in Section 3.2.2.8.

Section 3.2.2.4 describes the validation methods that require the use of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration and how a Network Perspective can corroborate the outcomes determined by the Primary Network Perspective.

Results or information obtained from one Network Perspective shall not be reused or cached when performing validation through subsequent Network Perspectives (e.g., different Network Perspectives cannot rely on a shared DNS cache to prevent an adversary with control of traffic from one Network Perspective from poisoning the DNS cache used by other Network Perspectives). The network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to a Network Perspective may be administered by the same organization providing the computational services required to operate the Network Perspective. All communications between a remote Network Perspective and TDID CA shall take place over an authenticated and encrypted channel relying on modern protocols (e.g., over HTTPS).

A Network Perspective can use a recursive DNS resolver that is not co-located with the Network Perspective. However, the DNS resolver used by the Network Perspective will fall within the same Regional Internet Registry service region as the Network Perspective relying upon it. Furthermore, for any pair of DNS resolvers used on a Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempt, the straight-line distance between the two States, Provinces, or Countries the DNS resolvers reside in shall be at least 500 km. The location of a DNS resolver is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound DNS queries are typically first handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that DNS resolver.

TDID CA may immediately retry Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration using the same validation method or an alternative method (e.g., a CA can immediately retry validation using “Email to DNS TXT Contact” if “Agreed-Upon Change to Website – ACME” does not corroborate the outcome of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration). When retrying Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, TDID CA shall not rely on corroborations from previous attempts. There is no stipulation regarding the maximum number of validation attempts that may be performed in any period of time.

The “Quorum Requirements” Table describes quorum requirements related to Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. If TDID CA does not rely on the same set of Network Perspectives for both Domain Authorization or Control and CAA Record checks, the quorum requirements must be met for both sets of Network Perspectives (i.e., the Domain Authorization or Control set and the CAA record check set). Network Perspectives are considered distinct when the straight-line distance between the two States, Provinces, or Countries they reside in is at least 500 km. Network Perspectives are considered “remote” when they are distinct from the Primary Network Perspective and the other Network Perspectives represented in a quorum.

TDIDI CA may reuse corroborating evidence for CAA record quorum compliance for a maximum of 398 days. After issuing a Certificate to a domain, remote Network Perspectives may omit retrieving and processing CAA records for the same domain or its subdomains in subsequent Certificate requests from the same Applicant for up to a maximum of 398 days.

Quorum Requirements Table

# of Distinct Remote Network Perspectives Used	# of Allowed non-Corroboration
2-5	1
6+	2

Remote Network Perspectives performing Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration must rely upon networks (e.g., Internet Service Providers or Cloud Provider Networks) implementing measures to mitigate BGP routing incidents in the global Internet routing system for providing internet connectivity to the Network Perspective.

For TLS Certificates issued on or after March 15th, 2025, TDID CA will require Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration using at least two (2) remote Network Perspective. TDID CA may proceed with certificate issurance if the number of remote Network Perspective that to not corroborate the determinations made by Primary Network Perspective ("non-corroboration") is greater than allowed in the Quorum Requirements Table.

Futhermore, TDID CA will implement Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration as following timeline;

- *Effective 15 September 2025*, TDID CA must use at least two (2) remote Network Perspective. TDID CA must not proceed with certificate issurance if the number of non-corroboration is greater than allowed in the Quorum Requirements Table. If the Quorum Requirements are not satisfied, then TDID CA MUST NOT proceed with issuance of the Certificate.

- *Effective 15 March 2026*, TDID CA must use at least three (3) remote Network Perspective. TDID CA must not proceed with certificate issurance if the number of non-corroboration is greater than allowed in the Quorum Requirements Table and if the remote Network Perspectives that do corroborate the determinations made by the Primary Network Perspective do not fall within the service regions of at least two (2) distinct Regional Internet Registries. If the Quorum Requirements are not satisfied, then TDID CA MUST NOT proceed with issuance of the Certificate.

- *Effective 15 June 2026,* TDID CA must use at least four (4) remote Network Perspective. TDID CA must not proceed with certificate issurance if the number of non-corroboration is greater than allowed in the Quorum Requirements Table and if the remote Network Perspectives that do corroborate the determinations made by the Primary Network Perspective do not fall within the service regions of at least two (2) distinct Regional Internet Registries. If the Quorum Requirements are not satisfied, then TDID CA MUST NOT proceed with issuance of the Certificate.

- *Effective 15 December 2026*, TDID CA will use at least five (5) remote Network Perspective. TDID CA must not proceed with certificate issurance if the number of non-corroboration is greater than allowed in the Quorum Requirements Table and if the remote Network Perspectives that do corroborate the determinations made by the Primary Network Perspective do not fall within the service regions of at least two (2) distinct Regional Internet Registries. If the Quorum Requirements are not satisfied, then TDID CA MUST NOT proceed with issuance of the Certificate.

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity

If an applicant subject to this section 3.2.3 is a natural person, then TDID CA will verify its identity using;

(i) Face to face process.

Appearance before TDID RA representative and TDID shall veriy a legible copy, which discernibly shows the Applicant's face, of at least one currently valid government-issued photo ID (passport, drivers license, military ID, national ID, or equivalent document type). If an applicant (such as minor under 18 years old) is unable to submit the above photo ID, government issued written documentation (such as household registration) sufficient to prove the identity of the applicant and one adult with legal capacity to guarantee the applicant's identity in writing may be used in its place. The identity of the adult providing the written guarantee must pass through the above authentication or;

(ii) Online process.

TDID CA shall rely on identity verification results provided by trusted Identity Providers (IdP) that meet the required assurance levels and comply with applicable standards including Department of Provincial Administration (DOPA).

Applying for a Personal Certificate through the TDID CA website or other online channels that require the use of this approach shall be deemed as the applicant's consent to use identity data provided by the trusted Identity Provider (IdP).

3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber Information

Issued Certificates must be confirmed and verified with the documents listed in the application. Application without complete proofs will not be approved.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority

The Certificate Authority will verify and retain the power of attorney attached with the application as the proof that the Subscriber is authorized by the directors and may apply on behalf of the company.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

Not applicable.

3.3 Identification and Authentification for Re-Key Requests

3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

The Subscriber must submit a new Certificate Application with required evidence to a Registration Authority as detailed in item 4.1 and 4.3.

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation

The Certificate Authority will verify the Key owner's information from the application form and submitted evidence that comprise the applicant's name, national ID card or passport number, and the applicant's own signature.

3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests

Subscriber who wishes to revoke their Certificate must directly contact the Certificate Authority. When the Certificate Authority has been informed of the revocation request and has completed the procedural verification, the Certificate Authority will revoke the Certification and publish on the Certificate Revocation List as described in item 4.9.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application?

Applicants may be individuals applying for Individual Certificates or individuals authorized to apply for Enterprise Certificates on behalf of their company to maintain the security of their electronic transactions. They may apply for Certificates listed under item 1.4.

4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

Applicants should follow the process described below:

Personal Certificate Application

Face to Face Process

1. Fill the Electronic Certificate application
2. The Applicants appear before TDID RA representative and deliver the application form and supporting evidence to:
   Registration Authority, Thai Digital ID Co., Ltd.
   319 25 th Floor, Room 10-11, Chamchuri Square Building, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330
   Tel. 02-029-0290 Ext.4
3. TDID RA verifies the application form and supporting evidence.
4. TDID RA delivers the Electronic Certificate to the Subscriber.
5. The Subscriber pays service fee.

Online Process

1. The Subscriber authenticated their identity data through the Department of Provincial Administration Digital ID (DOPA-Digital ID) , also known as the "ThaiID" application.
2. The Subscriber is required to authenticate their email address and mobile number using an OTP (One-Time Password) approach.
3. The Subscriber pays the applicable service fee.

Required Evidence (for Face to Face Process)

1. Signed photocopy of the Subscriber's national ID (or signed photocopy of passport in cases of non-Thai residents).

Juristic Person Certificate Application

Process

1. Fill the Electronic Certificate application

2. Submit the application form to:
   Registration Authority, Thai Digital ID Co., Ltd.
   319 25 th Floor, Room 10-11, Chamchuri Square Building, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330
   Tel. 02-029-0290 Ext.4
3. The registration officer verifies the application form and submitted evidence.
4. The registration officer delivers the Electronic Certificate to the Subscriber.
5. The Subscriber pays service fee.

Supporting Evidence

1. Copy of business registration certificate not older than 90 days (3 months) signed by an authorized director and sealed with Company's seal (if any).
2. Signed photocopy of the authorized director's national ID (or signed photocopy of passport in cases of non-Thai residents).
3. If the authorized director delegated the registration to another person, additional document to be submitted are:
   3.1 Power of attorney, affixed with 30-baht revenue stamps for each delegate.
   3.2 Signed photocopy of each delegate's national ID (or signed photocopy of passport in cases of non-Thai residents).

TLS/SSL Certificate Application

Process

1. Fill the Electronic Certificate application
2. Submit the application form to:
   Registration Authority, Thai Digital ID Co., Ltd.
   319, 25 th Floor, Room 10-11, Chamchuri Square Building, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330, Tel. 02-029-0290 Ext.4
3. The registration officer verifies the application form and submitted evidence.
4. The registration officer delivers the Electronic Certificate to the Subscriber.
5. The Subscriber pays service fee.

Supporting Evidence

For enterprise domain name registration:

1. Copy of business registration certificate not older than 90 days (3 months) signed by an authorized director and sealed with Company's seal (if any).
2. Copy of domain name registration certificate, signed by an authorized director.
3. Signed photocopy of the authorized director's national ID (or signed photocopy of passport in cases of non-Thai residents).

4. If the authorized director delegated the registration to another person, additional document to be submitted are:

4.1 Power of attorney, affixed with 30-baht revenue stamps for each delegate.

4.2 Signed photocopy of each delegate's national ID.

5. CAA Record on the DNS Server of the domain host must be updated to thaidigitalid.com

4.2 Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The Certificate Authority will verify the application and supporting evidence before issuing the certificate and will notify the Subscriber for any incorrect information on the application or incomplete supporting evidence.

TDID CA may reject applications based on risk-mitigation criteria, for instance; names at risk for phishing or other fraudulent usage, names listed on the Google Safe Browsing lists or names listed in the database maintained by the Anti-Phishing Working Group.

For SSL/TLS certificates the following data reuse limitation exist.

TDID CA may use the documents and data provided in Section 3.2 to verify certificate information, or may reuse previous validations themselves, provided that the CA obtained the data or document from a source specified under Section 3.2 or completed the validation itself within the maximum number of days prior to issuing the SSL/TLS Certificate, as defined in the following table:

SSL/TLS certificates issued on or after	SSL/TLS certificates issued on or before	Maximum data reuse period
-	15 March 2026	825 days
15 March 2026	-	398 days

For validation of Domain Names according to Section 3.2.2.4, any data, document, or completed validation used must be obtained within the maximum number of days prior to issuing the SSL/TLS Certificate, as defined in the following table:

SSL/TLS certificates issued on or after	SSL/TLS certificates issued on or before	Maximum data reuse period
-	15 March 2026	398 days
15 March 2026	15 March 2027	200 days
15 March 2027	15 March 2029	100 days
15 March 2029	-	10 days

A prior validation cannot be reused if any data or document used in the prior validation was obtained more than the maximum time permitted for reuse of the data or document prior to issuing the SSL/TLS Certificate.

4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

The Registration Authority will review the registration from electronic certificate application and supporting evidence for completeness and authenticity before issuing the certificate. In cases where some part or entirety of the electronic certificate application is either incorrect or incomplete, the document will be returned to the Subscirber with explanation about the issue.

4.2.2.1 CAA record processing

Prior to issuing an TLS/SSL Certificate, TDID CA shall retrieve and process the CAA record of the Subscriber's domain in accordance with RFC 8659 for each dNSName in the subjectAltName extension that does not contain an Onion Domain Name.

When processing CAA records, TDID CA shall process the issue, issuewild, and iodef property tags as specified in RFC 8659. Although TDID CA is not required to act on the contents of the iodef property tag. Additional property tags may be supported, but shall not conflict with or supersede the mandatory property tags set out in the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements. TDID CA shall respect the critical flag and not issue a certificate if they encounter an unrecognized property with critical flag set.

TDID CA recognizes the following Issuer Domain Name as permitting issuance in CAA issue and issuewild records:

Issuer Domain Name

thaidigitalid.com

TDID CA shall not issue a TLS/SSL Certificate unless TDID CA determines that the Certificate request is consistent with the applicable CAA RRset, or unless a permitted exception under the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements applies.

If no applicable CAA RRset exists for the requested dNSName, issuance may proceed subject to completion of all other applicable validation and issuance requirements.

If an applicable CAA RRset exists and does not authorize thaidigitalid.com, TDID CA shall not issue the TLS/SSL Certificate.

If the Subscriber chooses to publish a CAA record authorizing TDID CA, the DNS value may be configured as follows:

Record Type	Flags	Tag	Value
CAA	0	issue	thaidigitalid.com

Note: If the Subscriber sets only the issue record to ‘thaidigitalid.com’, TDID CA can issue both standard TLS/SSL Certificate and Wildcard Certificate, unless an applicable issuewild record provides otherwise. If the Subscriber requires separate authorization for Wildcard Certificate, an additional issuewild record may be configured as follows:

Record Type	Flags	Tag	Value
CAA	0	issuewild	thaidigitalid.com

Once an issuewild record is present, it takes precedence over the issue record for Wildcard Certificate requests, and the issue record will no longer apply to wildcard issuance.

If TDID CA issues a Certificate after processing a CAA record, TDID CA shall do so within the TTL (Time to Live) of the CAA record, or 8 hours from the time of CAA record retrieval, whichever period is greater.

TDID CA may treat a record lookup failure as permission to issue if:

1) the failure is outside the TDID CA's infrastructure;
2) the lookup has been retried at least once; and
3) TDID CA has confirmed that the domain is Insecure as defined in RFC 4035, Section 4.3.

TDID CA shall document potential issuances that were prevented by a CAA record in sufficient detail to provide feedback to the CA/Browser Forum on the circumstances, and may dispatch reports of such issuance requests to the contact(s) stipulated in the CAA iodef record(s), if present. TDID CA are not expected to support URL schemes in the iodef record other than mailto: or https:.

Note: TDID CA may check CAA records at any other time.

4.2.2.1.1 CAA Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration

Where the applicable method used to validate the Applicant's ownership or control of the subject domain(s) or IP address(es) requires Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration under Section 3.2.2.9, TDID CA shall retrieved and processed CAA records from the required Network Perspectives before Certificate issuance (see Section 3.2.2.9). In such cases, the following requirements apply:

To corroborate the Primary Network Perspective, a remote Network Perspective's CAA check response SHALL be interpreted as permission to issue, regardless of whether the responses from both Perspectives are byte-for-byte identical. Additionally, TDID CA may consider the response from a remote Network Perspective as corroborating if one or both of the Perspectives experience an acceptable CAA record lookup failure as define in Section 4.2.2.1

4.2.2.1.2 CAA Parameters

When processing CAA records, TDID CA should process the accounturi and validationmethods parameters as specified in RFC 8657.

Effective 15 March 2027, TDID CA shall process the accounturi and validationmethods parameters as specified in RFC 8657.

Where a CAA accounturi parameter is present, TDID CA shall determine whether the Certificate request is associated with the account identified by the accounturi parameter. TDID CA shall not issue the Certificate if the Certificate request is not associated with the identified account.

Where a CAA validationmethods parameter is present, TDID CA shall determine whether the domain validation method used for the Certificate request is permitted by

the validationmethods parameter. TDID CA shall not issue the Certificate if the domain validation method used is not permitted.

4.2.2.1.3 DNSSEC Validation of CAA Records

Effective 15 March 2026: DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor shall be performed on all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective. The DNS resolver used for all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective MUST:

1) perform DNSSEC validation using the algorithm defined in RFC 4035 Section 5; and
2) support NSEC3 as defined in RFC 5155; and
3) support SHA-2 as defined in RFC 4509 and RFC 5702; and
4) properly handle the security concerns enumerated in RFC 6840 Section 4.

Effective 15 March 2026: TDID CA shall not use local policy to disable DNSSEC validation on any DNS query associated CAA record lookups.

Effective 15 March 2026: DNSSEC-validation errors observed by the Primary Network Perspective (e.g., SERVFAIL) shall not be treated as permission to issue.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor may be performed on all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by Remote Network Perspectives as part of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration.

DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor is considered outside the scope of self-audits performed to fulfill the requirements in Section 8.7.

4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

After receiving the application, the Registration Authority will verify the supporting evidence. If the supporting evidence is complete, the electronic certificate will be issued within the next operating day.

4.3 Certificate Issuance

4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

4.3.1.1 Manual authorization of certificate issuance

Upon receiving a certification application, TDID CA and TDID RA will:

1) Perform identification and authentication functions following the requirements specified in Section 3.2;
2) Ensure accuracy of the information in the certificate application as specified in Section 4.2.1;
3) Ensure accuracy of the information in a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) that conforms with Section 6. If the CSR does not meet the requirements in Section 6, TDID CA will reject the CSR;
4) Generate and sign a certificate if all certificate requirements have been met; and

5) Make the certificate available to the Subscriber after confirming that the Subscriber has formally acknowledged their obligations as described in Section 9.6.3.

All authorization and other attributes of information received from a prospective Subscriber will be verified before inclusion in a certificate.

4.3.1.2 Linting of to-be-signed Certificate content

TDID CA implemented a Linting process to test the technical conformity of each to-be-signed artifact prior to signing it. When a Precertificate has undergone Linting, it is not necessary for the corresponding to-be-signed Certificate to also undergo Linting, provided that the TDID CA has a technical control to verify that the to-be-signed Certificate corresponds to the to-be-signed Precertificate.

TLS/SSL certificates issued on or after March 15, 2025 must follow a Linting process. Other certificate types may also follow a Linting process, at TDID CA's discretion.

Methods used to produce a certificate containing the to-be-signed Certificate content include, but are not limited to:

1) Sign the tbsCertificate with a "dummy" Private Key whose Public Key component is not certified by a Certificate that chains to a publicly-trusted CA Certificate; or

2) Specify a static value for the signature field of the Certificate ASN.1 SEQUENCE.

TDID CA will use the Linting tools that have been widely adopted by the industry (see https://cabforum.org/resources/tools/)

4.3.1.3 Linting of issued Certificates

TDID CA may use a Linting process to test each issued Certificate.

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

TDID CA will notify the Subscriber of the issuance of a certificate to the Subscriber by email.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

Upon the receipt of the Certificate, the Subscriber MUST verify the information contained in the certificate and determine whether to accept or reject the Certificate. The Subscriber MAY notify TDID CA if it accepts the Certificate or rejects the Certificate, along with the reasons for any rejection. Unless the Subscriber notifies TDID CA of a rejection within fifteen (15) days of receipt, the Certificate shall be deemed accepted. Furthermore, the Subscriber's commencement of use of the Certificate shall also constitute acceptance.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

The certificate accepted by the Subscriber will be published on X.500 Directory of the Certificate Authority.

4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Not applicable.

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

The Private keys shall only be used for correct keyUsages (key usages are listed in the keyUsages extension of the certificate) such as Digital Signature or Data Encryption usage for applications.

The Subscriber may not use expired or revoked certificates.

4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Responsibilities of parties in using the public key or certificate shall follow the regulations and conditions for each certificate category issued by the CA. Relying parties, however, must refer to and must verify the certificate status as described on the Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement.

4.6 Certificate Renewal

4.6.1 Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

Currently, the Certificate Authority does not issue new certificates to Subscribers without changing the public key or information that appears on the certificate.

Everyday, the system will notify the Subscribers whose certificates will expire within 60 or 30 days as a reminder for certificate renewal as described in item 4.1.

4.6.2 Who may Request Renewal

Not applicable

4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Request

Not applicable

4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Not applicable

4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

Not applicable

4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

Not applicable

4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Not applicable

4.7 Certificate Re-key

4.7.1 Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key

Subscribers may submit the certificate and supporting document to request new certificate with the same process described in item 4.1.

4.7.2 Who may Request Certificate of a New Public Key

Refer to item 4.1.

4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

Refer to item 4.1.

4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.8 Certificate Modification

4.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification

If cases where the Subscriber wishes to modify an issued certificate, the Subscriber must submit document for a certificate revocation and document for new application.

4.8.2 Who may Request Certificate Modification

Refer to item 4.1.

4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Request

Refer to item 4.1.

4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

Refer to item 4.3 and 4.4.

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

Except as TLS/SSL Certificates, TDID CA SHALL revoke a Subscriber Certificate within seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:

- The Subscriber requests revocation in writing.
- The Private Key becomes known, accessed, or used by a third party.
- The Private Key lost, modified, disclosed without authorization or has been subject to other damage or misuse.
- The password used to access the Private Key becomes known by a third party.
- The device used to store Private Key becomes lost or unusable.
- The Subscriber's company has ceased its operation.
- The subscriber wishes to modify information on the certificate such as names.
- The Subscriber does not comply with the CA's terms and conditions of certificate use, Certificate Policy/Certificate Practice Statement, or service agreement.
- Following a court order or prosecution.
- The Certificate Authority's Pricate Key becomes known by a third party.
- The Certificate Authority has suspended or ceased its operation. The Certificate Authority has receveied an incident report from a security vendor about a malicious certificate.
- Other circumstances where the Certificate Authority has deemed to impact the security of certificate providing service

For TLS/SSL Certificates, TDID CA shall revoke a certificate within twenty-four (24) hours and use the corresponding CRLReason (see Section 7.2.2) If one or more of the following occurs:

- The Subscriber requests revocation in writing, without specifying a CRLreason, that the CA SHALL revoke the Certificate (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extention being provided in the CRL).
- The Subscriber notifies TDID CA that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn).
- TDID CA obtains reliable evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).
- TDID CA is made aware of a proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).

- TDID CA obtains reliable evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any FQDN or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon (CRLReason #4, superseded).

For TLS/SSL Certificates, TDID CA may revoke a certificate within twenty-four (24) hours and shall revoke a Certificate within five (5) days and use the corresponding CRLReason (see Section 7.2.2) If one or more of the following occurs:

- The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 and Section 6.1.6 or was not issued in accordance with this CP/CPS (CRLReason #4, superseded).
- TDID CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn).
- TDID CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn).
- TDID CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation).
- TDID CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn)
- TDID CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn)
- TDID CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn)
- TDID CA's right to issue Certificates expires or is revoked or terminated (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL)
- TDID CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise)

4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

1. TDID CA may revoke any issued certificate whenever it knows or reasonably suspects that the circumstances as specified in section 4.9.1 occurred.
2. TDID RA may make a request to revoke a certificate whenever it knows or reasonably suspects that the circumstances as specified in section 4.9.1 occurred.
3. Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports informing the issuing CA of reasonable cause to revoke the certificate.
4. Court order.

4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports in accordance with the instructions established in this CP/CPS or by TDID RA by sending email to: rasupport@tdid.com

TDID CA processes a revocation request as follows:

1. TDID CA logs the request or incident report and the reason for requesting revocation based on the list in section 4.9.1 TDID CA may also include its own reasons for revocation in the log
2. If the request from the Subscriber, TDD CA revokes the Certificate based on the reason for revocation listed in 4.9.1 and the Subscriber processs as follows;

   2.1 The certificate revocation applicant fills and signs the certificate revocation request.

   2.2 Submit the revocation request and supporting document to the registration authority staff. The supporting document consists of:

   - For personal certificate, a signed photocopy of the Subscriber's national ID (or signed photocopy of passport in cases of non-Thai residents).
   - For enterprise certificate, a copy of business registration certificate not older than 90 days (3 months) signed by an authorized director and sealed with Company's seal (if any) and a signed photocopy of the authorized director's national ID (or signed photocopy of passport in cases of non-Thai residents).
     - If the authorized director delegated the registration to another person
     - Power of attorney, affixed with 30-baht revenue stamps for each delegate.
     - Signed photocopy of each delegate's national ID.

   2.3 The Registration Authority officer verifies the revocation request and supporting evidence.

   2.4 The Registration Authority officer will only revoke the certificate after verifying the certificate revocation request and supporting evidence.
3. In the event of receiving a report from a third party, TDID shall investigate such report and decide whether revocation is appropriate based on thefollowing criteria:

   a. the nature of the alleged problem,

   b. the number of reports received about a particular Certificate or website,

   c. the identity of the complainants (for example, complaints from a law enforcement official that a web site is engaged in illegal activities have more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging they never received the goods they ordered), and

   d. relevant legislation

For TLS/SSL Certificates, TDID CA maintain a continuous 24/7 ability to receive and respond to any high priority revocation requests and Certificate Problem Reports. The Subscriber can submit the

revocation on the following website: https://www.thaidigitalid.com/ASCH/ (Select Certificate revocation request form then fills in related support information for revocation request) or call Tel. 02-029-0290 ext. 4 (business hours GMT+7) and Tel. 02-029-0290 ext. 1 (Off-business hours).

Remark

Certificate revocation does not only remove the certification from the database. The revoked certificate will be permanently terminated, published on the CA system.

4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

The Certificate Authority will normally revoke the certificate within one business day after receiving revocation request and verifying the revocation request and supporting document.

4.9.5 Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

(1) Refer to item 4.9.4

(2) For TLS/SSL Certificates, within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, TDID CA shall investigate the facts and circumstances related to a Certificate Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report. After reviewing the facts and circumstances, TDID SHALL work with the Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which TDID CA will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published revocation must not exceed the frame set forth in the section 4.9.1. The date selected by TDID CA will consider the following criteria:

1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber;
4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer alleging that they didn't receive the goods they ordered); and
5. Relevant legislation.

4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties

Relying Parties are responsible for checking the validity of each certificate in the certificatepath, including checks for certificate validity, issuer-to-subject name chaining, certificate policy and key usage constraints, and the status of the certificate through the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

CRL shall be available via a publucy-accessible HTTP URL (i.e., "published").

TDID CA shall update and publish a new CRL at least every twelve (12) hours. Any certificate revoked in between will be updated in the next CRL.

4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

The Certificate Authority will publish CRL on its website within 1 hour.

4.9.9 On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

TDID shall provide the On-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and conform to RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019.

OCSP responses will either:

1. Be signed by TDID CA, or

2. Be signed by an OCSP Responder whose Certificate is signed by TDID CA (In the latter case, the OCSP signing Certificate MUST contain an extension of type id-pkixocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC 6960.)

On-line status checking information shall be regularly updated and available to relying parties.

4.9.10 On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements

Refer to item 4.9.9

4.9.11 Other Form of Revocation Publishing Available

The Certificate Authority does not have other revocation publication other than CRL and OCSP.

4.9.12 Special Requirements Key Compromise

The Certificate Authority has policies for handling of crucial data leakage and continuity of service. Any leakage of data regarding the Subscriber's private key will be informed to the Subscriber and the affected certificate will be revoked.

4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

Not Applicable.

4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

Not Applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

Not Applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

Not Applicable.

4.10 Certificate Status Services

The Subscriber and/or Relying Parties can check the certificate statuses on the CA's website or by calling the RA office.

4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

Certificate status services shall be provided in the forms of CRL and OCSP. Revocation entries on a CRL or OCSP Response shall not be removed until after the Expiry Date of the revoked Certificate.

4.10.2 Service Availability

The Certificate Authority provides 24-hour certificate status reporting service on its website.

4.10.3 Optional Features

Not Applicable.

4.11 End of Subscription

Subscribers may end the use of certificate by following procedures described under item 4.9.3: Procedure for Revocation Request.

The Subscriber may end a subscription by allowing its certificate to expire without requesting a new certificate.

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

The CA does not provide escrow service for personal keys. Subscribers are responsible for secure retention of personal key. Personal keys issued to the Subscribers must only be appropriately used according to the category.

4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

Refer to item 4.12.

4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

Refer to item 4.12.

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1 Physical Security Controls

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The office of the Certificate Authority is at building number 319, Chamchuri Square Building, 25th floor, Room 10-11, Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok, 10330 that is compliant with ISO27001 (Information Security Management System: ISMS) and WebTrust (Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities) standards for CA. The CA has additionally equipped the following equipment at the site of the CA system for safety and security.

1) CCTV for record of event images at the site.

2) Door Hold Open Sounder that will alarm when the door is held open for the safety of the site.

4) Smoke Detector System for fire prevention.

5) FM-200 Fire Extinguisher (gas) that does not harm the computer system.

6) Added metal sheets on each wall, ceiling, and floor of the server room to prevent all kinds of breach.

5.1.2 Physical Access

Only authorized personnels and visitors supervised by authorized personnels can access the operation area of the certificating process. Authorization requires password, RFID Staff ID card, and fingerprint scan. The number of authorized personnels is minimized and all access to the operation area will be logged.

The CA site is access-controlled and zoned according to security levels only accessible by authorized personnels and visitors supervised by authorized personnels.

5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

All service systems are supplied with standard electrical output with uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to ensure continuity. The temperature and humidity within the service systems are controlled by air conditioning system independent from the building's air conditioning system.

5.1.4 Water Exposures

The operation area is protected from water exposure by elevation and is located in a non-flood area. The building is designed to be 6 inches higher than surrounding area.

5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

The fire prevention system utilizes FM-200 type agent that does not damage electronics or computers. The system includes smoke detectors.

5.1.6 Media Storage

All media will be stored in multiple safe rooms.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

All waste and unused equipment will be disposed. Unused data disposal will be controlled in compliance with ISO 27001 standard.

5.1.8 Off-site Backup

Data from the main operation center will be automatically backed up to the secondary operation site everyday.

5.2 Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Trusted Roles

Combination of access control and key management does not allow any single individual to access the entire system. The roles in operation are divided for security and must at least consist of the following roles:

5.2.1.1 Trusted Roles for Certification Authority

Consist of:

- CA Operation Manager, responsible for
  - Management of the Subscribers' Private Keys
  - Making and supervision the security policies regarding certificating service system
  - Reviewing the operation of System Support and System Administrator officers
- System Support Officers, responsible for
  - Defining important parameters for systems relating to the certificating service system
  - Operation and management of computer network devices relating to the certificating service system
  - Defining important parameters for computer network devices relating to the certificating service system
- System Administrator Officers, responsible for
  - Performance tuning and security hardening for the computers
  - Management of Subscribers' private keys
  - Making and supervision the security policies regarding certificating service system
  - Reviewing the operation of System Support officers and CA operators
- CA Operators, responsible for
  - Operation and management of computers for the certificating service system
  - Maintenance of the computer operating system
  - Operation and management of data storage for the certificating service system

5.2.1.2 Trusted Roles for Registration Authority

Can be divided as following:

- RA Operators, responsible for
  - Reception of electronic certificate applications
  - Identification and verification of Subscribers
  - Issuance of certificates
  - Reception of certificate revocation requests
  - Revocation of certificates as requested by the Subscribers
  - Publishing certificate revocation lists
- RA Auditors, responsible for
  - Auditing RA Operator

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required Per Task

Operational tasks are divided as described above, allowing a balanced, secure, and accountable operation. The key principles for task sharing are:

1. CA Operator must be separated from System Administrator to ensure separation from the audit log
2. Any task that involves using CA system or database access must require at least 2 operators. One of which will be the operator and the other an inspector.

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for each Role

Personnel assigned for operation must be officially selected by standard process to ensure "trustworthiness".

5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

The duties of CA and RA officers are separated.

- CA Officers' main tasks are operation and management of certificate service systems, related softwares (Database, firewall, and LDAP), and system backup.
- RA Officers' main tasks are review of electronic certificate applications, verification of supporting evidence, issuance and revocation of certificates.

5.3 Personnel Controls

The CA will select trustworthy officers based on knowledge and skills required in operation. The selection process will include criminal background check. The criminal background check will be reconducted every 3 years.

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

Must have at least a bachelor's degree in computer science, Information Technology, Computer Engineering, or related majors.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

The CA will submit the candidates who have passed preliminary recruitment process to the National Police Bureau for background check. After receiving the police clearance, the CA will consider appointing the candidate after 3 months of probation.

5.3.3 Training Requirements

Training subjects for new recruits include:

- Basic PKI Concept
- Job responsibilities
- Operational policies and procedures
- ISO27001 Standard
- WebTrust Standard for CA
- BCP and DRP plans

5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Officers will be provided with training for their duties and responsibilities on a yearly basis as well as additional training when a new technology is introduced to the operating environment.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

Officers' performance will be assessed every 2 years, where job rotation and promotion will also be considered.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

Sanctions will be according to the regulations of the certificate authority.

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

To perform tasks without involvement of a trusted role, independent contractors are only permitted to access to TDID CA's secure facilities if they are escorted and directly supervised by TDID CA personnel at all times.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

CA and RA Officers will be supplied with CA Operation Manual and RA Operation Manual.

5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

The following events will be logged in the system:

CA Events Recorded

- CA key life cycle management events
- Key Generation, Backup, Storage,

- CA and Subscriber certificate life cycle management, including:
  (If issuing SSL/TLS certificates): Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration attempts from each Network Perspective, minimally recording the following information: (1) an identifier that uniquely identifies the Network Perspective used; (2) the attempted domain name and/or IP address; and (3) the result of the attempt (e.g., "domain validation pass/fail", "CAA permission/prohibition").
- Certificate application, Renewal, Revocation
- Effective 2026-07-15, SSL/TLS certificates, records of verification activities must include at a minimum:
  (1) the information being validated (e.g., the applied-for FQDN or the organization name);
  (2) the Authorization Domain Name (ADN) used (if applicable and different from the applied-for FQDN); and
  (3) the validation method used (e.g., the the applicable CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements section number or the registered label of an ACME validation method);
- Successful or unsuccessful processing of request

RA Events Recored

- RA Operation log
- Method used to validate identification document

Environment Events Recored

- Security-related events including
- Security profile changes
- System crashes, hardware failures
- Firewall and router activity (as described in Section 5.4.1.1)
- Facility visitor entry/exit.

5.4.1.1 Router and firewall activities logs

Logging of router and firewall activities necessary to meet the requirements of Section 5.4.1 shall at a minimum include:

1) Successful and unsuccessful login attempts to routers and firewalls; and
2) Logging of all administrative actions performed on routers and firewalls, including configuration changes, firmware updates, and access control modifications; and
3) Logging of all changes made to firewall rules, including additions, modifications, and deletions; and
4) Logging of all system events and errors, including hardware failures, software crashes, and system restarts.

5.4.2 Frequency of Log Processing

Audit Log will be reviewed by the officers on a daily basis and will be thoroughly inspected in cases suspicious occurrences arise.

The log reviewing will include the log and all document related to the event logged.

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

Audit logs will be retained as below.

- At least 2 years for SSL/TLS Certificate
- At least 90 days for Enterprise/Enterprise User/Individual Certificate

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

Audit log records can only be accessed by authorized personnel.

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

Audit log will be automatically backed up to the Log Server everyday.

5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)

The service provider keeps the log of the OS, Application, and Firewall at the local machine and keeps the backup at the secondary operation center.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject

When an issue concerning Audit Log occurs, the responsible officer will diagnose, analyze, and notify responsible officers related to the issue.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments & Penetration Testing

The CA will regularly conduct vulnerability assessment every 3 months and penetration testing every year.

5.5 Records Archival

5.5.1 Types of Records to be Archived

The following events will be recorded:

CA Events Recorded

- CA key life cycle management events
- Key Generation, Backup, Storage,
- CA and Subscriber certificate life cycle management
- Certificate application, Renewal, Revocation
- Successful or unsuccessful processing of request

RA Events Recored

- RA Operation log
- Method used to validate identification document

Environment Events Recored

- Security-related events including
- Security profile changes
- System crashes, hardware failures
- Firewall and router activity

- Facility visitor entry/exit

5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive

The CA will retain the information related to the certificate for 10 years and will retain the information related to the certificating system as required by the Computer Crimes Act B.E. 2550 (2007)

5.5.3 Protection of Archive

The archive must only be accessible to authorized personnel.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

Data from the main operation center will be automatically backed up to the secondary operation site everyday.

5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records

Any activity performed on or to the certification systems shall be recorded with the time and date information.

5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)

The information mentioned in item 5.5.1 will be kept both as hard copy and soft file both at the main operation center and secondary operation center.

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

Only authorized persons may access the archive. The archive information will be verified in cases where the information is used.

5.6 Key Changeover

To minimize risk from compromise of a CA's private signing key, that key may be changed often. From that time on, only the new key will be used to sign Subscriber certificates.

The CA's signing keys shall have a validity period as described in section 6.3.2.

When a CA updates its private signature key and thus generates a new public key, the CA shall notify the Subscribers that rely on the CA's certificate that it has been changed

5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

If compromise of TDID CA is suspected, an independent third-party investigation shall be performed in order to determine the nature and the degree of damage. Certificates issuance shall be stopped immediately upon detection of a compromise. If a TDID CA private signing key is suspected of compromise, the procedure outlined in Section 5.7.3 shall be followed. Otherwise, the scope of potential damage shall be assessed in order to determine if TDID CA needs to be rebuilt, only some certificates need to be revoked, and/or the TDID CA private key needs to be declared compromised.

In case that there is an event that affects the security of TDID CA system, the corresponding TDID CA officers shall notify the PA if any of the following occur:

1) Suspected or detected compromise of any TDID CA system or subsystem.

2) Physical intrusion or electronic penetration of any TDID CA system or subsystem.

3) Successful denial of service attacks or disruption on any TDID CA system or subsystem.

4) Any incident preventing TDID CA from issuing and publishing a CRL or online status checking prior to the time indicated in the nextUpdate field in the currently published CRL, or the certificate for online status checking suspected or detected compromise

5.7.1.1 Incident Response and Disaster Recovery Plans

TDID CA shall establish and maintain an incident response plan and disaster recovery plan.

TDID CA shall document business continuity and disaster recovery procedures designed to notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, Subscribers, and Relying Parties in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure.

TDID CA is not required publicly disclose its business continuity plan but shall make its business continuity plan available to the TDID CA's auditors upon request. TDID CA shall annually test, review, and update (if necessary) this plan.

The business continuity plan shall include:

1. The conditions for activating the plan,
2. Emergency procedures,
3. Fallback procedures,
4. Resumption procedures,
5. A maintenance schedule for the plan;
6. Awareness and education requirements;
7. The responsibilities of the individuals;
8. Recovery time objective (RTO);
9. Regular testing of contingency plans.
10. TDID CA's plan to maintain or restore TDID CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
11. A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;
12. What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
13. How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken;
14. The distance of recovery facilities to TDID CA's main site; and
15. Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

5.7.1.2 Mass Revocation Plans

TDID CA shall establish and maintain a mass revocation plan. TDID CA shall perform annual testing of the mass revocation plan, and incorporate lessons learned into such plan in order to continually improve preparedness for mass revocation events over time.

TDID CA's mass revocation plan shall include clearly defined, actionable, and comprehensive procedures designed to ensure rapid, consistent, and reliable response to large-scale certificate revocation scenarios. TDID CA is not required to publicly disclose its mass revocation plan or procedures but shall make them available to its auditors upon request. TDID CA shall annually test, review, and update (if necessary) its plan and such procedures. TDID CA's mass revocation plan may be integrated into the TDID CA's business continuity plan, or other similar plans or procedures, provided that provisions governing mass revocation events remain clearly identifiable and comply with this CP/CPS.

The mass revocation plan (or provisions as applicable) shall include:

1. Activation criteria – specific, objective, and measurable thresholds at which the mass revocation plan is triggered based on TDID CA's risk profile, issuance volumes, and operational capabilities;

2. Customer contact information – how subscriber and customer contact details are stored, maintained, and kept up to date;

3. Automation points – processes that are automated or could be automated, and those processes that require manual intervention;

4. Targets and timelines – for incident triage, revocation initiation, certificate replacement, and post-event review;

5. Subscriber notification methods – mechanisms for notifying impacted Subscribers;

6. Role assignments – roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible for initiating, coordinating, and executing the plan;

7. Training and education – training, awareness, and readiness activities for personnel responsible for, or supporting, the plan;

8. Plan testing – annual operational testing to assess readiness and demonstrate implementation feasibility, using one or more of tabletop exercises, simulations, parallel testing, or controlled test environments that not involve the revocation of active Subscriber Certificates; and

9. Post-test analysis and update schedule – how lessons learned from testing or live incidents are incorporated into the plan, and how often it is reviewed and updated.

5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

Resource management shall include Maintenance Plan (MA Plan) and usage cycle life check. If any resource whether hardware, software, or data appear corrupted, they must be disposed and managed according to the safety policy of the CA.

5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures

The CA provides procedures for continuity and management in cases of compromises of key information. If the private key of the CA or Subscriber is compromised, NRCA and all related Subscribers

will be notified. All affected private keys and certificates will be revoked immediately once the compromise is confirmed.

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

The CA has the business continuity plan and disaster recovery plan to alleviate the situations when an issue or occurrence has caused to system to halt.

5.8 Certificate Authority or Registration Authority Termination

In the cases where the Certificate Authority or the Registration Authority has to terminate its operation, the CA will notify the NRCA and the Subscriber at least 60 days in advance and the CA will arrange for the transfer to another system, a replacement system, or another appropriate measure to correct the impact that might arise from the termination.

6. Technical Security Controls

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

Cryptographic keying material used by Thailand NRCA to sign certificates, CRLs or status information are generated in FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or equivalent standard validated cryptographic modules. Multi-party control is required for Thailand NRCA key pair generation, as specified in Section 6.2.2. Thailand NRCA key pair generation created a verifiable audit trail demonstrating that the security requirements for procedures were followed. The documentation of the procedure has shown that appropriate role separation was used. An independent third party has validated the execution of the key generation procedures by witnessing the key generation, as well as by examining the signed and documented record of the key generation. Subordinate CA key pair generation shall be performed by the Subordinate CA. The Subordinate CA is required to generate the signature key pairs for the purpose of digital signature by FIPS 140 FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated hardware cryptographic modules to support source authentication. The subordinate CA shall not generate keys for SSL certificates.

1. The generated key pair shall be explicitly used as a Subordinate CA key pair, under the hierarchy of the "Thailand NRCA".

2. The private key shall be used exclusively for CA signing operations, including the issuance of end-entity certificates and CRL generation.

3. The public key shall be included in the Subordinate CA's certificate signed by the "Thailand NRCA".

6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

For CA Key Pairs that are used as a CA Key Pair for a Root Certificate.

The CA SHALL:

1) prepare and follow a Key Generation Script,

2) have a Qualified Auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process and a video recording of the entire CA Key Pair generation process, and

3) have a Qualified Auditor issue a report opining that the CA followed its key ceremony during its Key and Certificate generation process and the controls used to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the Key Pair. For other CA Key Pairs that are for the operator of the Root CA or an Affiliate of the Root CA, the CA SHOULD:

1) prepare and follow a Key Generation Script and

2) have a Qualified Auditor witness the CA Key Pair generation process or record a video of the entire CA Key Pair generation process.

In all cases, the CA SHALL:

1) generate the CA Key Pair in a physically secured environment as described in this CP/CPS;

2) generate the CA Key Pair using personnel in Trusted Roles under the principles of multiple person control and split knowledge;

3) generate the CA Key Pair within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable technical and business requirements as disclosed in this CP/CPS;

4) log its CA Key Pair generation activities; and

5) maintain effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the Private Key was generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in its CP/CPS and (if applicable) its Key Generation Script.

6.1.1.2 RA Key Pair Generation

No stipulations

6.1.1.3 Subscriber Key Pair Generation

The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:

1) The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;

2) There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;

3) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;

4) The CA has previously been made aware that the Applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;

5) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute the Applicant's Private Key based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys). If the Subscriber Certificate will contain an extKeyUsage extension containing either the values id-kpserverAuth [RFC 5280] or anyExtendedKeyUsage [RFC 5280], the Subordinate CA SHALL NOT generate a Key Pair on behalf of a Subscriber, and SHALL NOT accept a certificate request using a Key Pair previously generated by the CA.

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscribers

The Subscriber is required to generate its own key pair. If the Subscriber lacks the necessary tools or capability, TDID CA will provide appropriate instructions to support secure key pair generation.

Where the Certificate is issued for use with a remote signing service (excluding TLS/SSL Certificates), the remote signing provider shall generate and/or hold the remote signing subscriber's private key within a secure cryptographic environment and shall prevent disclosure of the private key. TDID CA shall only issue the Certificate and shall not generate the key pair or maintain custody of the remote signing subscriber's private key.

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

Public key delivered to the certificate authority will be formatted as PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) or sent through website certified with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) standards.

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The CA's public key will be delivered to the relying parties either attached with the Subscriber's certificate or downloadable at the CA's website.

6.1.5 Key Sizes

The CA's key size will be RSA 4096-bit. The Subscribers' key size will be a RSA-2048-bit.
TDID CA use the SHA-256, SHA-512 hash algorithm when issuing certificates and CRLs and generating digital signatures.

6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation & Quality Checking

The CA will generate public key parameters according to the X.509 Version 3 standards. The quality checking will be automatically done with the certificating system.

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes

The key usage purposes have been described under item 1.4: Certificate Usage.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and controls

The cryptographic module is certified with Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 Level 3, an international standard for generation and security of private key for certificating system.

6.2.2 Certificate Authority's Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control

The CA's private key has multi-person control in place.

6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

The CA does not provide escrow service for private keys.

6.2.4 Private Key Backup

Only CA's private keys are backed up.

6.2.5 Private Key Archival

The CA private keys beyond the validity period will be kept at least 10 years and stored in Cryptographic Module with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 standards

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

The CA's private key is generated in cryptographic module certified with Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 Level 3 and will only be decrypted by authorization process through hardware with the same level security and only with correct password from the certificate authority's CA.

6.2.7 Private Key storage on cryptographic module

TDID CA shall store their Private Keys on a cryptographic module which complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or above standard.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

Private keys of the CA and Subscribers will be activated by authorization process through hardware with the same level security and only with correct password.

6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

The private key can only be deactivated upon a revocation request from the Subscriber.

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

TDID CA will delete the private keys from the Cryptographic Module and its backup by overwriting the private key or initialize the module with a zeroization function. The event of destroying TDID CA must be recorded into evidence under Section 5.4.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

Private keys of the CA and Subscribers are generated with standardized softwares.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public Key Archival

The public key will be on the certificate and the certificate will be retained in the CA's database throughout its operational period.

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The usage periods of the certificate and key pair of the CA is 20 years.

The validity period of a certificate issued under this CP/CPS shall not exceed the maximum validity periods as below

Type of Certificate	Maximum Validity Periods
Personal Certificate	2 years
Juristic Person Certificate	2 years
Enterprise User Certificate	2 years

Machine Certificate	2 years
TLS/SSL Certificate	825 days (Certificates issued after 1 March 2018 but prior to 1 September 2020)
TLS/SSL Certificate	398 days (Certificates issued on or after 1 September 2020 but prior to 15 March 2026)
TLS/SSL Certificate	200 days (Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2026 but prior to 15 March 2027)
TLS/SSL Certificate	100 days (Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2027 but prior to 15 March 2029)
TLS/SSL Certificate	47 days (Certificates issued on or after 15 March 2029)

6.4 Activation Data for Installation of the Certificate

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

The activation data of the Subscribers are securely generated and kept. To activate the certificate, the Subscriber must contact the CA to verify the authority of the certificate Subscriber. Then, the certificate will be activated through the CA's software system and the certificate status on X.500 Directory will be updated.

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

The Subscribers' activation data will be protected by the protection system of HSM device according to the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or 3 standards such as password or other authorization process for certificate installation.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

There is no other information other than key information used for certificate application.

6.5 Computer Security Controls

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

The CA has arranged a system security plan that incorporates the computer security technical requirements for certificating according to the ISO 27001 (Information Security Management System: ISMS) and WebTrust for CA (Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities) Standards.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

The CA has arranged a system security plan that incorporates computer security rating for certificating according to the ISO 27001 (Information Security Management System: ISMS) and WebTrust for CA (Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities) Standards.

6.6 Life Cycle Security Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls

The software of the certificating system is developed under appropriate quality controls according to the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria Level E3 (ITSEC E3).

The software must be performed in a test environment before deployment in a production environment. Any change to the CA systems must go through the Change-Advisory Board review and approval.

6.6.2 Security Management Controls

The security management controls are controlled and managed under the ISO 27001 (Information Security Management System: ISMS) WebTrust for CA (Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities) systems with the details regarding the tools, procedures, and trusted personnel described under item 5.2.1: Trusted Roles.

6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Ratings

The CA has created risk assessment document that identifies and mitigate the life cycle security risks rated as 'high risk' and 'very high risk' in certificating system.

6.7 Network Security Controls

The network control for certificating system has been designed to only use related computers and devices. TDID CA system is connected *to one internal network* and is protected by firewalls and Network Address Translation for all internal IP addresses.

Both hardware and software firewalls (only configurable by IT Security Manager) are utilized to prevent intrusion from external source. The system also includes Intrusion Protection System (IPS) and Anti-Virus.

The certificate public services (i.e CRLs, OCSP) are allowed to access through public internet.

6.8 Timestamping

The system clock will be set in the time setting device (NTP Server) or a trusted time source which shall be accurate within three minutes. Any recording time in the system will refer to the same time setting device.

7. Certificate, Certificate Revocation List, and OCSP Profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

7.1.1 Version number(s)

Certificates issued by the CA conforms with X.509 Version 3 Certificate Standard and has the following information:

- Version 3
- Serial Number
- Signature Algorithm: Algorithm TDID CA uses for signature generation
- Issuer: The name of certificate issuer
- Validity: The start and end date of certificate validity
- Subject: National ID number or tax ID of enterprise
- Subject Public Key Information: Public key and generating algorithm

7.1.2 Certificate Extension

Additional information of the certificate issued by the CA following the X.509 V.3 certificate extensions standards that contains at least the following information:

- Authority Key Identifier: Public key of the CA
- Key Usage: Intended usage for the key
- Extended Key Usage: Extended usage for the key
- CRL Distribution Points: Location of the CRL for status check
- Basic Constraints: Categories of the certificate whether it belongs to the CA or Subscribers and the maximum number of certificate chain.
- Certificate Policies: Reference to the Certificate Policy in the form of Object Identifier (OID)
- Authority Information Access: Indicates how and where to access information about the issuer of the certificate.
- Subject Alternative Name: Allows identities to be bound to the subject of the certificate.
- Subject Key Identifier: Provide a means of identifying certificates that contain a particular public key.

7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

The OID of digital signature and encryption of certificate is in Section 1.2. as follows;

Algorithm	Object Identifier
SHA256 withRSAEncryption	1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
SHA512withRSAEncryption	1.2.840.113549.1.1.13
RSAEncryption	1.2.840.113549.1.1.1

7.1.4 Name Forms

Names in Certificate Issuer and Certificate Subject fields of the certificate are distinguished names according to X.500 standard.

The Distinguished Name (DN) of TDID CA will use the following information:

C	=	TH
S	=	<State>
L	=	<Locality>
O	=	<Customer Corporate name in English>
organizationIdentifier	=	<Customer Corporate tax ID>
OU	=	<Department Name in English >
Title	=	<Position in organization>
Serial Number	=	<identification ID>
Givenname	=	<Customer First Name in Thai>
SN	=	<Customer Last Name in Thai>
CN	=	<Customer Name in English>
E	=	<Email>

The information that appears as the DN also depends on the Certificate Policy, viewable on TDID Website (https://www.thaidigitalid.com).

7.1.5 Name Constraints

Comma (,) may not be used as TDID uses comma (,) as a divider between each Distinguished Name (DN)

7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

For issuing SSL/TLS Certificates, TDID CA shall follow section 7.1.6 of CA/B Forum TLS Baseline Requirements. Furthermore, all certificate issuing by TDID CA shall contain Certificate Policy OID as identified in Section 1.2.

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No Stipulation.

7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

The CA has described its policies qualifiers syntax and semantics under Certificate Policy on TDID Website (URL: https://www.thaidigitalid.com/downloads/).

7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

2 fields of critical extensions are identified: Basic Constrains and Key Usage.

7.2 Certificate Revocation List Profile

Prior to 2024-03-15, the CA SHALL issue CRLs in accordance with the profile specified in Version 2.1 of TDID CP/CPS. Effective 2024-03-15, the CA SHALL issue CRLs in accordance with the profile specified in these Requirements.

The CA's certificate revocation list must comply with RFC 5280 as the following details as in table below.

Field	Value or Value Constraint
Version	Version of the certificate revocation list will be version number 2 as provided in Section 7.2.1.
Signature	The method of digitally sign consists of Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (Public Key Algorithm) and data digestion (Hash Function) which is used by Certification Authority to sign the certificate in form of Object Identifier (OID).
issuer	The name of the Certification Authority in the certificate must be in the format of Distinguished Name (DN) in accordance with ISO / IEC 9594-2.
thisUpdate	The date and time of the revocation list.
nextUpdate	The specified date and time to the next update of certificate revocation list. If necessary, TDID CA will issue the certificate revocation list before the scheduled date and time.
revokedCertificates	A list of the serialNumber of the certificate has been revoked with the specified date and time of revocation.
extensions	See Section 7.2.2

7.2.1 Version number(s)

CRL published by the CA uses X.509 CRL Version 2

7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions

The information on certificate revocation lists issued by the Certification Authority complies with the ISO / IEC 9594-8:2012 standard and contains at least the following:

Extension	Value
Authority Key Identifier	Subject Key Identifier of the CRL issuer certificat

CRL Number	Never repeated monotonically increasing integer
IssuingDistributionPoint	See Section 7.2.2.1 CRL Issuing Distribution Point

The CA SHOULD update the revocation date in a CRL entry when it is determined that the private key of the Certificate was compromised prior to the revocation date that is indicated in the CRL entry for that Certificate. Backdating the revocationDate field is an exception to best practice described in RFC 5280 (Section 5.3.2); however, these requirements specify the use of the revocationDate field to support TLS implementations that process the revocationDate field as the date when the Certificate is first considered to be compromised.

In the event that reasonCode is present, reasonCode shall not be marked as critical and TDID CA shall specifies the reasonCode as appropriate for most instance when used in accordance with the practice in this CP/CPS. ReasonCode must be present unless the CRL entry is for a Certificate not technically capable of causing issuance and either 1) the CRL entry is for a subscriber Certificate subject to these Requirements revoked prior to 15 July 2023 or 2) the reasonCode is unspecified (0).

The following is a description of each of these reason codes and circumstances where TDID CA or a Subscriber will be obligated to use it for their revocation circumstances:

reasonCode	**reasonCode value**	**Description**
unspecified	0	Represented by the omission of a reasonCode. Must be omitted if the CRL entry is for a Certificate not technically capable of causing issuance unless the CRL entry is for a Subscriber Certificate subject to these Requirements revoked prior to July 15, 2023.
keyCompromise	1	Indicates that it is known or suspected that the Subscriber's Private Key has been compromised.
affiliationChanged	3	Indicates that the Subject's name or other Subject Identity Information in the Certificate has changed, but there is no cause to suspect that the Certificate's Private Key has been compromised
superseded	4	Indicates that the Certificate is being replaced because: the Subscriber has requested a new Certificate, TDID CA has reasonable evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any fully-qualified domain name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon, or TDID CA has revoked the Certificate for compliance reasons such as the Certificate does not comply with this CP/CPS or orther requirements.

cessationOfOperation	5	Indicates that the website with the Certificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the Certificate, or if the Subscriber no longer owns or controls the Domain Name in the Certificate prior to the expiration of the Certificate.
certificateHold	6	MUST NOT be included if the CRL entry is for 1) TLS/SSL Certificate, or 2) Subscriber Certificate and was either A) issued on or after 2020-09-30 or B) has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30
privilegeWithdrawn	9	Indicates that there has been a subscriber-side infraction that has not resulted in keyCompromise, such as the Certificate Subscriber provided misleading information in their Certificate Request or has not upheld their material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

The Subscriber Agreement, or an online resource referenced therein, MUST inform Subscribers about the revocation reason options listed above and provide explanation about when to choose each option. Tools that the CA provides to the Subscriber MUST allow for these options to be easily specified when the Subscriber requests revocation of their Certificate, with the default value being that no revocation reason is provided (i.e. the default corresponds to the CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL).

The privilegeWithdrawn reasonCode SHOULD NOT be made available to the Subscriber as a revocation reason option, because the use of this reasonCode is determined by the CA and not the Subscriber.

When a CA obtains verifiable evidence of Key Compromise for a Certificate whose CRL entry does not contain a reasonCode extension or has a reasonCode extension with a non-keyCompromise reason, the CA SHOULD update the CRL entry to enter keyCompromise as the CRLReason in the reasonCode extension.

7.2.2.1 CRL Issuing Distribution Point

Partitioned CRLs MUST contain an Issuing Distribution Point extension. The distributionPoint field of the Issuing Distribution Point extension MUST be present. Additionally, the fullName field of the DistributionPointName value MUST be present, and its value MUST conform to the following requirements:

1) If a Certificate within the scope of the CRL contains a CRL Distribution Points extension, then at least one of the uniformResourceIdentifiers in the CRL Distribution Points's fullName field MUST be included in the fullName field of the CRL's Issuing Distribution Point extension. The encoding of the uniformResourceIdentifier value in the Issuing Distribution Point extension SHALL be byte-for-byte identical to the encoding used in the Certificate's CRL Distribution Points extension.

2) Other GeneralNames of type uniformResourceIdentifier MAY be included.

3) Non-uniformResourceIdentifier GeneralName types MUST NOT be included.

The indirectCRL and onlyContainsAttributeCerts fields MUST be set to FALSE (i.e., not asserted). The CA MAY set either of the onlyContainsUserCerts and onlyContainsCACerts fields to TRUE, depending on the scope of the CRL.

The CA MUST NOT assert both of the onlyContainsUserCerts and onlyContainsCACerts fields.

The onlySomeReasons field SHOULD NOT be included; if included, then the CA MUST provide another CRL whose scope encompasses all revocations regardless of reason code.

This extension is NOT RECOMMENDED for full and complete CRLs.

7.3 OCSP profile

The Online Certificate Status Protocol is an online mean to check the status of a certificate. TDID CA provides certificate status information through OCSP protocol conforming to RFC 6960 or RFC 5019.

The CRLReason indicated shall contain a value permitted for CRLs, as specified in Section 7.2.2.

7.3.1 Version number(s)

The CA's OCSP uses X.509 OCSP Version 1 standard according to the rfc6960 standard (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960).

7.3.2 OCSP extensions

The singleExtensions of an OCSP response does not contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension.

8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment

The Certificate Authority under the name of TDID CA G3 adheres to the ISO 27001 (Information Security Management System: ISMS) standard for policies regarding risk assessment and security and has arranged for internal and external audits with the latest WebTrust for CA (Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities) and WebTrust for CA - SSL Baseline (WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security) standards published on http://www.cabforum.org for its certificating and management for trustworthiness.

TDID CA has a compliance audit mechanism in place to ensure that the requirements of its CP/CPS are being implemented and audited for complying with the following standards: .

o Adobe Approved Trust List – Technical Requirements (if applicable).

o Electronic Transactions Act, B.E. 2544 (2001) and related version.

o The NRCA CP.

o CA/Browser Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements.

o CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates (for SSL/TLS Certificate)

o WebTrust for Certification Authorities - WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Network Security

8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

The CA will be assessed for the following standards at least once a year:

1. ISO 27001 Standard
2. Webtrust for CA Standard
3. Webtrust for CA - SSL Baseline Standard

8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

Assessor for ISO 27001, Webtrust for CA, and Webtrust for CA - SSL Baseline standards must be qualified to certify the associated standards.

8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

Auditors must be independent from TDID CAand RAs being audited, or it shall be sufficiently organizationally separated from those entities and shall provide an unbiased, independent evaluation. To insure independence and objectivity, the compliance auditor may not have served the entity in developing or maintaining the entity's CA facility or certification practice statement. The CA shall determine whether a compliance auditor meets this requirement. There must not be conflict of interest to the CA.

8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The purpose of compliance audit is to verify that a CA and its RAs comply with all the requirements of the current version of the CP and the CA's CPS. The audit meets the requirements of the audit schemes highlighted in Section 8 under which the assessment is being made. These requirements may vary as audit schemes are updated. An audit scheme is applicable to CAs in the year following the adoption of the updated scheme.

8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

Any deficiency within the system reported must be corrected by the CA within the period set by the assessor.

The plan will be submitted to auditors and Thailand NRCA to ensure that sufficient security of the system is still in place.

8.6 Communication of Results

After the assessment is completed, the audit compliance report and identification of corrective measures (if any) must be sent to the PA within 30 days of completion. However, the audit compliance report must be sent to the PA and made publicly available within three months after the end of the audit period. In the case of delay, the CA shall provide an official letter signed by the qualified auditor.

8.7 Self-Audits

TDID CA SHALL ensure compliance with its CP/CPS, as well as strictly control its service quality by performing self-audits on at least a quarterly basis. Randomized samples of the greater of one certificate or at least three percent of the certificates issued since the previous self-audit was performed.

9. Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1 Fees

The CA will collect fees for the following instances:

1. Certificate Issuance
2. Certificate Renewal

Applicable fees can be viewed on the CA's website.

9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

The certificate issuance or renewal fees will be displayed on the certificated issued from the system.

9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

The CA does not collect fees for Subscriber's access to the certificate.

9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

The CA does not collect fees for Subscriber's access to the CRL published on the CA's website.

9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

The CA does not collect fees for downloading the CP/CPS document.

9.1.5 Refund Policy

The CA will not charge for certificate issuance if the Subscriber request for revocation of such certificate within 15 days from issuance.

9.2 Financial Responsibility

9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

The CA has electronic device insurance, property insurance against public unrest, and fire insurance for electronic certificate service providers.

9.2.2 Other Assets

The CA is a legal entity registered in accordance with Thai law with asset information available in the financial statement on Department of Business Development's (Ministry of Commerce) website.

9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

The CA guarantees the accuracy of information present on the certificate. In cases there is any mistake associated with the RA or CA, the Subscriber must notify the CA within 15 days after issuance. The CA will then issue a new certificate free of charges.

9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

Electronic certification service providers have defined the scope of confidentiality of business information, including business plans, sales information, trade secrets, and information obtained from third parties in pursuit of service agreement, contract, or other service document.

9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

Confidential information that must not be disclosed includes:

- Certificate issuance list
- Subscribers' Private Key
- Audit record
- Audit report
- Business continuity plan

9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

The certificates, revoked certificates, and certificate statuses are not confidential information that may be disclosed. Other information not interpreted as confidential or non-confidential will be considered in accordance with the appropriate laws.

9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

The CA will not disclose confidential information to unrelated entities in any circumstance.

9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

Any processing of personal information must be consented by the Subscriber before personal data can be disclosed except for instances of lawful enforcement or court order to disclose personal information.

9.4.1 Privacy Plan

The CA has a defined privacy plan and will keep the Subscribers' private information confidential.

9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

Private information in this document means related information of Subscribers that is not included in the certificate or directory.

9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private

The CA and Subscribers acknowledge and agree that information on the certificates is not confidential.

9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

The CA is strictly responsible for protection of private information.

9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

In cases there are reasonable grounds for disclosing the Subscribers' private information, the CA must priorly acquire a written consent from the Subscriber.

9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

The CA reserves the right to disclose its Subscribers' private information in cases of court requests for judicial or administrative process under Thai law.

9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

Any case that requires disclosure other than in item 9.4.6 must also be priorly consented by the Subscriber in writing.

9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

TDID CA is the sole owner of intellectual properties within and arising from this Certificate Policy/ Certification Practice Statement. TDID authorizes to copy the CP/CPS may be copied in the CCADB and Trust Store archives, and posted on the public Bugzilla.

9.6 Representations and Warranties

9.6.1 CA representations and warranties

The CA guarantees that

- Approvals of certificate issuance are processed under strict supervision of the CA against all errors.
- Certificate issued by the system complies with this Certificate Policy/ Certification Practice Statement.
- Certificate status report via the LDAP repository complies with this Certificate Policy/ Certification Practice Statement.

9.6.2 RA representations and warranties

The RA guarantees that

- Information in certificate application and supporting document will be thoroughly and carefully reviewed. There will be no alteration to the information provided in the certificate application form.
- Information on the certificate application will be delivered to the CA under strict supervision by the RA to prevent errors.
- Certificate issued by the system complies with this Certificate Policy/ Certification Practice Statement.

9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties

The Subscriber guarantees that

- Certificate issued by the CA will be appropriately used within the scope and according to this Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement.
- Private key will be securely kept and not usable by others.
- Information on the certificate application form is accurate and true.
- Information on the certificate is extract from the application form and is accurate and true.
- The Subscriber is an individual, organization, or company that does not operate as a CA Provider.

9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

In case Relying Party representations use a certificate, the Relying Party shall properly verify information inside the certificate before use and accepts the fault of single side verification.

9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants

Not applicable

9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

The CA makes no warranties, whether express or implied, other than those appearing on this Certificate Policy/ Certification Practice Statement, nor does it guarantee commercial performance or any specific purpose.

9.8 Limitations of Liability

Any liability relating to the certificate will be limited to no more than 30 times the fees of the certificate for each case of damage.

The CA shall not be held liable for any damage due to the use of certificate that is either illegal or outside of scope of appropriate use according to this Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement or violation of the terms and conditions of the CA. Additionally, the CA shall not be held liable for indirect and consequential damages, damages caused by special circumstances, and loss of revenue or commercial profits.

The first paragraph shall not apply if there is other existing limitation of liability for each type of certificates in the related terms or contracts.

9.9 Indemnities

Indemnity claims shall be agreed between the CA and Subscribers. However, in cases where relying parties use the certificate without checking the CRL, the CA reserves its right to deny any indemnity claims for any damage to arise. In case the damage occurs to the CA from the actions of Subscribers or relying parties, the CA reserves the right to claim damages.

9.10 Term and Termination

9.10.1 Term

This CP/CPS of TDID CA takes effect from the date of publication upon the approval of the PA.

9.10.2 Termination

This CP/CPS of TDID CA takes effect until it is terminated.

9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival

This CP/CPS remains in effect through the end of the archive period for the last certificate issued.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

The CA provides means of communications for Subscribers including telephone and email as shown on the CA's website. TDID CA will communicate to those participants using a reliable channel as soon as possible in accordance with the importance of information.

9.12 Amendments

The CA reserves the right to modify, add, cancel, or change any terms of service within this document.

9.12.1 Procedure for amendment

In cases where the CA wishes to modify, add, cancel, or change any term in this document, the CA will notify its Subscriber or the RA at least 90 days before the effective date of change. The notice may be a letter, email, or announcement on CA website: www.thaidigitalid.com.

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

If the CA or its Subscriber deem that the modification, addition, cancellation, or change of the terms will decrease their legitimate right, the RA or Subscriber may request termination of the service according to this document by notifying the CA not less than 30 days prior to the effective date of termination, except for modification, addition, cancellation, or change of the terms required by law.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed

The CA does not specify the circumstances when OID must be changed.

9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures

9.13.1 Disputes between Issuer and Subscriber

In cases of dispute regarding the certificate issuance or any acts arising out of or in connection with this CP/CPS, all parties will first try to negotiate in good faith. Alternatively, the CA or the Subscriber may also elect to submit such dispute to the NRCA PA, which shall have the authority to settle the dispute.

If the dispute cannot be settled (whether through negotiation or by the NRCA PA) within 60 days after the dispute arises, the parties shall resolve such dispute by arbitration in Bangkok, Thailand, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the Thai Arbitration Institute, Office of the Judiciary (2017) and any amendments thereto ("the Arbitration Rules"). The arbitral tribunal shall consist of 3 arbitrators, whose selection shall be governed by the Arbitration Rules.

The arbitral award of dispute in the first paragraph shall be in accordance with the Arbitration Rules, the Arbitration Act B.E. 2545 (2002), and any other applicable arbitration laws then in force. The CA and

the Subscriber agree to share the costs, expenses and fees of arbitration equally, while each party shall bear its own legal fees.

9.13.2 Disputes between Issuer and Relying Parties

The same procedure as stated in Section 9.13.1.

9.14 Governing Law

Any agreement in this document shall be interpreted and enforced in accordance with the laws of Thailand.

9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

The CA agrees to comply with Thai laws relating to the electronic certificate issuance.

9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1 Entire agreement

This document in combination with the certificate application, and terms of certificate use shall be considered important information provided by the CA to the Subscribers regarding terms for the management of certificate and shall be equivalent to an agreement between the CA and Subscribers to process and comply with such document.

9.16.2 Assignment

The CA agrees not to transfer the rights or duties described in this document whether partially or its entirety to a third party unless prior written consent is obtained from the Subscriber.

Such consent pursuant to paragraph one does not clear the CA off the liabilities accrued as results of this agreement and thus, the CA shall share the liabilities for damages caused by the recipient whether willfully or by negligence.

9.16.3 Severability

In circumstances where any part of this document becomes void, incomplete, or unenforceable by law, the affected clause or clauses shall not affect the applicability of other clauses within this agreement which are complete and enforceable.

9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

The party that violates the agreement will be liable for all costs accrued including attornes' fees arising out of non-compliance with this document and/or related document.

Any waiver or extension made by any party pursuant to this document shall be deemed situational that only applies to that instance and does not imply waiver for the rights in accordance with this document.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

Each party shall not be held liable to the damages resulting from inability or delay to act according to this document due to force majeure.

In circumstances where one party cannot act according to this document due to force majeure, the affected party must immediately notify other party in writing, describing the nature of the force majeure, action taken to mitigate or negate the impact of such force majeure, and estimation of possibility of the force majeure to subside.

Force majeure may refer to events beyond the control of each party that result in the inability or impossibility to perform their duties described in this document. Force majeure may include natural disasters, earthquakes, fires, explosions, strikes, labor disputes, protests, accidents, epidemics, storms, floods, wars, revolutions, civil unrests, and shortage or resources such as water, electricity, fuel, or labour, etc.

In the circumstances that force majeure persists for longer than 30 days, both parties may agree to terminate the service or certificate issuance according to this contract.

9.17 Other provisions

Not applicable